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TENSIONS ON THE KOREAN 
PENINSULA: IMPLICATIONS FOR NEW 
ZEALAND 
 
Paul Sinclair 
 
Introduction 
New Zealand’s bilateral relationship with South Korea is founded on strong political, economic and 
security links that date back to the Korean War. New Zealand responded to the United Nations Security 
Council’s call for members of the United Nations to assist South Korea in 1950 with a substantial 
commitment of Defence personnel that on a per capita basis exceeded that, for example,  of Australia. 
 
Not only did this response signal New Zealand’s support for the United Nations, it was also to realise the 
objective of securing a security commitment from the United States in the event of further aggression from 
Japan. That commitment was embodied in the ANZUS Treaty signed in June 1951.  
 
How times have changed. New Zealand has a wide-ranging relationship with Japan that, whaling apart, is 
close and friendly. New Zealand did not recognise the People’s Republic of China at the time of the Korean 
War, but our relationship has rapidly developed to the point where China is now vital to our economic 
prosperity. We are no longer a full alliance partner of the United States, although the signature in June 
2012 of the Washington Declaration on Defence Cooperation between the United States and New Zealand 
will undoubtedly have created expectations in Washington, and in some other capitals, of support from 
New Zealand, particularly in respect of Asia/Pacific security challenges. 
 
This paper examines recent developments on the Korean Peninsula, including the responses of China and 
the United States, and considers the implications for New Zealand. It then proposes a way ahead. But 
before doing so it provides some background comment on the Armistice, the United Nations Command 
Military Armistice Commission known as UNCMAC, and the Six Party Talks. 
 
The Armistice 
The Armistice was signed on 27 July 1953 by General Nam Il, a North Korean Deputy Premier and Chief of 
Army Staff, delegate of both the Korean People’s Army and the Chinese People’s Volunteers, and Lt Gen 
William Harrison Jr., a United States officer who was the United Nations Command delegate. South Korea 
was not a signatory. The Armistice established a “complete cessation of all hostilities in Korea by all armed 
force”. It was and remains only a cease-fire agreement. It is not a peace treaty. The Korean War has 
therefore never officially ended.  
 
Pyongyang has long sought to enter into negotiations directly with Washington on a bilateral peace treaty 
with the United States that would replace the Armistice. The exclusion of South Korea, an important 
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United States ally, from such a process is unacceptable to Washington. South Korea’s inclusion is 
unacceptable to North Korea given the South’s non-signatory status, and the North’s refusal to 
acknowledge South Korea as an independent country. The Armistice Agreement envisaged the withdrawal 
of all foreign forces from Korea, but in the absence of a peace treaty United States forces remain on the 
peninsula. 
 
The Armistice established a four kilometre-wide Demilitarised Zone between North and South Korea, a 
fortified buffer zone that is now the most heavily defended national border in the world.  
 
In 1957, suspecting North Korea had acquired unspecified new weapon systems contrary to a provision of 
the Armistice, the United States informed North Korean representatives at a meeting of the Military 
Armistice Commission, that the United Nations Command no longer considered itself bound by that 
provision. The following year the United States deployed nuclear weapons to South Korea where they 
were to remain until 1991. The decision to deploy was taken in Washington not in New York, underlining 
that in fact if not in name this is effectively a United States Command.  
 
North Korea’s recent declaration that it would no longer abide by the Armistice is the sixth such statement 
since 1994. The United Nations responded to the latest declaration by again reminding the North that the 
Armistice remains valid and is “still in force” as it was approved by the UN General Assembly. 
 
The United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission [UNCMAC] 
UNCMAC was created to ensure that the parties comply with the terms of the Armistice Agreement. It is a 
multinational mission led by the United States. There is a close New Zealand interest in UNCMAC’s 
mission as a continued expression of support for the Armistice. New Zealand Defence Force officers have 
served with UNCMAC since 1998. Their role is to maintain an awareness of what is happening in their 
area of operations, to investigate breaches by either side and report their findings to the United Nations 
Command.  
 
UNCMAC has continued to function throughout periods of heightened tension. There is a direct phone 
line between UNCMAC and the Korean People’s Army [KPA]. Despite its fiery rhetoric the KPA has not 
cut this line, but it is not currently answering phone calls from UNCMAC officers. UNCMAC messages are 
being passed by “bullhorn” and were being acknowledged by the KPA at the time this paper was being 
prepared.  
 
Six Party Talks: Early Promise Soon Faded 
The Six Party Talks hosted by China began in 2003. Their aim was to end North Korea’s nuclear 
programme through a negotiating process involving China, the United States, South and North Korea, 
Japan and Russia. Following several rounds of talks it seemed by September 2005 that progress had been 
achieved.  Pyongyang agreed to abandon its nuclear programme, re-join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty from which it had withdrawn three years earlier, and allow International Atomic Energy Agency 
{IAEA} monitors to return to the North. In return North Korea was to receive food and energy assistance. 
For their part the United States and South Korea both affirmed that they would not deploy nuclear 
weapons on the peninsula, and the United States committed to work towards normalising relations with 
North Korea.  
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A subsequent decision by Washington to impose sanctions on North Korean trading entities and a Macao 
bank suspected of money-laundering for North Korea provoked strong condemnation from Pyongyang. 
The North boycotted the next round of talks and conducted a number of missile tests and its first nuclear 
test. These actions prompted the UN Security Council to pass a resolution requiring North Korea to refrain 
from further nuclear or missile testing and to return to the Six Party Talks.  
 
Further talks in 2007 resulted in another denuclearisation plan in exchange for aid and the release of the 
frozen Macao bank funds. The North appeared to be adhering to this agreement when it began disabling 
the Yongbyon facility which had provided the fissile material for the first nuclear weapons test. In return 
the United States eased sanctions on the regime and removed North Korea from its State Sponsors of 
Terrorism list. But Pyongyang failed to agree to a verification protocol for its nuclear programme and 
restarted that programme in late 2008.  
 
North Korea ignored signals from the new Obama Administration that it was willing to engage the North. 
Pyongyang chose instead to conduct further missile tests and another nuclear test, activities that resulted 
in the United States securing UN Security Council agreement to tougher sanctions in 2009. History 
demonstrates over the last ten years that for every action taken against the North Korean regime there is a 
robust reaction. In 2010 the North sank the South Korean naval ship Cheonan with considerable loss of life, 
unveiled a new uranium enrichment facility and light water reactor at Yongbyon, and shelled the South 
Korean island of Yeongpyeong with further loss of life.   
 
Six Party Talks have not been held since 2009. During bilateral talks with the United States in 2011, 
Pyongyang indicated it would return to the multi-party talks provided there were no preconditions. This 
was unacceptable to Washington and Seoul.  
 
In February 2012 North Korea now under Kim Jong-un’s leadership, agreed to suspend nuclear tests and 
allow the International Atomic Energy Agency to return to Yongbyon, but events were again to take a 
different course. In December North Korea launched a long range rocket regarded by defence analysts as a 
test of ballistic missile technology. That triggered a by now familiar sequence of events. The imposition of 
broader sanctions on North Korea by the UN Security Council followed by a third nuclear test much more 
powerful than its predecessors. 
 
In March 2013 the Security Council passed yet another round of sanctions on North Korea that imposed 
tough restrictions on banking, travel and trade. On this occasion China, presumably exasperated by its ally, 
did not try to water down these sanctions. The Security Council’s resolution also reaffirmed the UN’s 
support for the Six Party Talks and called for their resumption. The sanctions are therefore designed to 
punish the North for acts that endanger the international interest, but not to bring North Korea to its knees. 
That distinction seems to have been lost on Pyongyang. 
 
Kim Jong-un 
When Kim Jong-un came to power there were hopes that his exposure to the West as a teenager at a Swiss 
boarding school would have influenced him to pursue more liberal policies. His February 2012 agreement 
to suspend nuclear tests suggested such hopes were not misplaced. So what transpired to produce such a 
different outcome? 
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The most likely factor was pressure from the hard-line military and from other conservative elements in 
the regime. He may be the grandson of the “eternal president” as Kim Il-sung came to be known after his 
death, but the pursuit of policies seen as anathema by those determined to preserve the legacy of the first 
president of North Korea, may have forced Kim Jong-un’s hand.  
Kim Jong-un appears to have fallen back on the North Korean habit of highly provocative behaviour aimed 
at pressuring the international community to provide aid, and at strengthening his power base at home. 
Even by the standards of North Korean rhetorical excesses, however, his bellicose threats have been 
extreme. His threat to turn Seoul into a sea of fire is not new, but the threat of a nuclear attack on the 
United States is.  
 
Ironically the United States Defence Intelligence Agency’s recent finding that it had moderate confidence 
that the North had already mastered the technology of building a weapon that could fit into a missile 
warhead, unhelpfully gave some credibility to the North’s threats of nuclear attack. But the United States 
Director of National Intelligence was quick to state that the Agency’s position did not reflect the consensus 
view of the United States 15 other intelligence agencies.  
 
Kim Jong-un has acted counter-intuitively by closing down Kaesong Industrial Park. A collaborative 
North-South venture opened in 2005, this facility is situated just north of the DMZ. It gave South Korean 
companies the opportunity to employ cheap labour and became an important source of badly needed 
foreign currency for the North as wages for the 53,000 North Korean employees were paid directly to their 
Government. The North has shut down the complex previously but only for brief periods. The current 
prolonged closure has the self-inflicted cost of further reducing hard currency inflows to the North, dealing 
a further hammer blow to an economy already in dire straits. 
 
In such a hermetically sealed society it is impossible to assess with any accuracy Kim Jong-un’s real 
motives. Was timing a factor in his campaign? Was this a bid to demonstrate to the new leaders in China, 
Japan and South Korea that they should not mistake his youthfulness and inexperience for a lack of resolve? 
President Park’s election as President of South Korea certainly would not have been welcomed in 
Pyongyang. Her electoral success was an unwelcome reminder to the North of failed attempts to 
assassinate her father when he was President in 1968 and again in 1974.  
 
Was Kim Jong-un sending a message to newly elected President Xi Jinping that he is not beholden to China?  
Or is he struggling to convince hard-liners that he is worthy to inherit the family mantle, and/or needs to 
remind North Koreans that they must continue to make sacrifices because of external threats? It could be a 
combination of all these factors. He has likely calculated that by standing up to the United States he is 
demonstrating that he is worthy to be compared to his father but more especially to his revered 
grandfather. 
 
Could Kim Jong-un Miscalculate? 
Is there a risk that buoyed by the successful rocket launch and the February nuclear test both of which 
demonstrated significant technological capability enhancements, Kim Jong-un might miscalculate?  He is 
very light on leadership experience, and has shown no interest in engaging other countries. He has options 
available to him, short of a nuclear attack, should he decide to move beyond rhetoric. While outmatched by 
the South Korean military and professionally inferior, the Korean People’s Army has significant special 
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force and artillery capabilities. It could launch its Musudan medium range missiles. Or it could revert to 
terrorism.  
 
Any North Korean attack now would bring swift retribution from the South. There was widespread 
criticism of what many South Koreans considered a weak response to the attacks that took place in 2010. 
President Park has emphasised that an attack now would produce a robust and swift response. Retaliation 
although entirely understandable could have far-reaching consequences.  
 
There is another unwelcome outcome of recent developments as calls grow in the South for the 
development of its own nuclear deterrent capability, including from a prominent member of the National 
Assembly. Current negotiations between South Korea and the United States on a new nuclear cooperation 
agreement include a request to enrich uranium and to reprocess nuclear fuel originally bought from the 
United States. Any move towards a nuclear deterrent capability in the South risks pushing Japan in the 
same direction. 
 
China and the United States   
China’s alliance with the DPRK dates back to the Korean War. There are trade ties and close military links. 
The relationship was characterised by the Chinese as being “as close as lips and teeth”. But North Korea is 
proving an increasingly troublesome ally. China is deeply suspicious of the United States “pivot”. It 
considers the decision to strengthen America’s military presence in the Asia/Pacific demonstrates intent to 
contain China. Through its belligerence North Korea is very effectively making the case for the pivot. 
North Korea’s actions and bluster have reinforced to United States allies the importance of a stronger 
American military presence in the region.  
 
North Korea’s threats also placed unwanted pressure on Beijing to rein in Kim Jong-un. Before departing 
for Beijing in April for talks on North Korea, United States Secretary of State Kerry made it clear that he 
expected China to use its leverage as North Korea’s “economic lifeline and diplomatic partner”. Chinese 
statements just prior to that visit had in fact already shown some movement in that direction.  
 
China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi had stated on 6 April that China “does not allow trouble-making at the 
doorsteps of China”. President Xi Jinping spoke in similar terms in his address at the opening ceremony of 
the Bo’ao Forum the following day in commenting that “no-one should be allowed to throw the region, or 
even the whole world, into chaos”.  
 
President Xi probably had two targets in mind. Professor Cheng, a North Korean expert at Beijing’s 
Renmin University said that the President’s “primary target was North Korea”. He added that the 
comments were a “slap” at both North Korea and the United States which Beijing considers has 
contributed to the North’s belligerence through its current round of military exercises with South Korea. 
Cheng, accurately as it transpired, took the view that this message if ignored in Pyongyang, would lead to 
meaningful reductions in aid for the first time.  
 
There was still no sign Kim Jong-un was listening. According to United States officials who accompanied 
Secretary Kerry to Beijing, their Chinese counterparts had indicated they had not been able to establish the 
same close relationship they had enjoyed with his father. It is understood that Kim Jong-un has never met 
President Xi and appeared in no hurry to do so.  
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In determining how to deal with North Korean intransigence, China will be careful not to cross some “red 
lines”. China fears an implosion that would lead to a flood of North Koreans across its border threatening 
its economic and social development plans. Measures that could cause the regime to collapse could not 
therefore be contemplated. Nor does China want to see a unified peninsula with the unwelcome prospect 
of United States troops on or near the Chinese border. Pyongyang will be aware of such concerns and may 
unwisely have presumed that Beijing therefore have had little room for manoeuvre.  
 
There is some common ground between China and the United States with respect to North Korea. Neither 
wants conflict on the peninsula. In his remarks to media following his meeting with China’s State 
Councillor Yang Jiechi in Beijing, Secretary Kerry noted that the United States and China had underscored 
their joint commitment to the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner. He added 
that agreement had been reached to have further discussions “to bear down very quickly with great 
specificity on exactly how we will accomplish this goal”. 
 
In response Councillor Yang stated that China is “firmly committed ... to advancing the denuclearisation 
process on the peninsula” noting that to properly address the nuclear issue “serves the common interests 
of all parties” and is the shared responsibility of all parties”. China would work with other relevant parties 
including the United States to play a constructive role in promoting the Six Party Talks and the “balanced 
implementation of the goals set out in the September 19 joint statement of 2005” {which is referred to 
earlier in this paper}. He also emphasised the importance of enhancing bilateral dialogue with the United 
States. China’s Special Envoy for North Korea was subsequently dispatched to Washington for further 
talks. 
 
The complex China-United States relationship rarely moves in a linear fashion, however. A few days after 
Secretary Kerry’s visit the Chinese Ministry of Defence released a defence paper which noted that “some 
country has strengthened its Asia Pacific military alliances, expanded its military presence in the region, 
and frequently makes the situation tenser” [sic]. The release of the defence paper with its obvious reference 
to the United States implied that in Beijing suspicions about United States intentions still ran very deep. 
 
In May China tightened inspections on cross-border trade and its state banks have halted business with 
North Korea’s Foreign Trade Bank suggesting a loss of patience with North Korea. Zhang Liangui, a North 
Korea expert at the China Communist Party’s Central Party School, was reported in China’s Global Times 
on 29 May as saying that “the former administration always put ensuring the peace and stability of the 
Korean Peninsula in first place, while the current administration sets the denuclearisation of the peninsula 
first”. The Global Times added that the changes in China’s policy towards North Korea were in the United 
States interest. These comments were made as preparations were taking place for President Xi Jinping’s 
visit to the United States. The policy change was described by Shi Yinhong of Beijing’s Renmin University 
as a “big gift” to the United States. 
 
China’s harder line towards North Korea may have been instrumental in Kim Jong-un deciding to send 
Special Envoy Vice Marshal Choe to Beijing in late May for the purpose of mending ties. His visit was the 
first high level contact between Beijing and Pyongyang this year.  
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Choe was given a strong message by senior Chinese civilian and military officials about endangering peace 
and stability on the Korean Peninsula. But state-run Chinese and North Korean news agencies gave quite 
different interpretations of visit outcomes. The China News Service reported that Choe had confirmed that 
North Korea would accept a Chinese proposal to open up dialogue. The North Korean Central News 
Agency made no mention of such an undertaking. Zhu Feng, Professor of International Relations at Peking 
University and a former Kippenberger Visiting Professor at the Centre for Strategic Studies, commented 
that the visit “seemed to do little to repair the troubled relations between China and North Korea”. 
 
Implications for New Zealand 
As noted earlier New Zealand’s close relationship with South Korea is anchored in our participation in the 
Korean War six decades ago {but increasingly supplemented and dominated by a trade relationship of real 
importance to Wellington}. New Zealand continues to take a close interest in developments on the Korean 
Peninsula and to provide officers for UNCMAC. We have supported the Six Party Talks process and UN 
sanctions on North Korea. Defence co-operation with the South Korean military includes periodic anti-
submarine warfare exercises, Special Forces cooperation, an annual defence dialogue and the regular 
attendance of South Korean officers at the NZDF’s senior Command and Staff College course. There is also 
a bilateral logistic support agreement currently awaiting renewal.  
 
South Korea is likely to have expectations of support from New Zealand in the hopefully unlikely event of 
war erupting again on the peninsula. Aside from the difficult questions our policymakers would face in 
that event, the economic consequences for the region and particularly for New Zealand, given such heavy 
exposure to markets in North-east Asia, would be profound. Indeed there would be economic harm for 
each of our top five trading partners including Australia given its own heavy reliance on North-east Asian 
economies.  
 
The Way Ahead  
Kim Jong-un’s bottom line is regime survival. The development of a nuclear weapons capability is intrinsic 
to that goal. North Korea seems convinced that only a nuclear capability can deter the United States from 
trying to topple the regime by force despite Washington emphatically ruling that out. The greatest threat to 
the regime, however, is not external attack but at some point in the not too distant future, the threat of 
implosion if it can’t offer its people a better future. A nuclear capability will be of no use in that eventuality.  
 
China is clearly irritated by Pyongyang’s determination to continue down the nuclear path. But as noted 
above, China has its own bottom line which is to avoid any action that might precipitate an implosion in 
the North with the social, economic and strategic consequences that would follow. That limits Beijing’s 
leverage and Pyongyang knows it.  
 
A further complication is that attempts to find a way forward are taking place against a backdrop of 
China’s suspicions about United States motives, an uneasiness mirrored in Washington about Beijing’s 
ambitions; tensions between China and Japan over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands and between South Korea 
and Japan over the Dokdo/Takeshima islands. Adding to this unhelpful mix is the unfortunate resurrection 
of visits by senior members of Japan’s Abe Administration to the Yasukuni Shrine, rekindling barely 
suppressed memories of Japan’s wartime occupation of large parts of mainland Asia.  
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Despite these other preoccupations, the international community needs to focus as a matter of urgency on 
devising ways of reducing the risk of miscalculation on the Korean Peninsula. Ever tougher sanctions on 
the North may convey a sense of resolve on the part of the international community. But they have 
heightened rather than eased tension as has the deployment of more United States troops to the region. As 
J Michael Cole, deputy editor of the Taipei Times argued recently, “While such actions can act as a 
deterrent against North Korea, they only postpone – and render less likely – the resolution of the conflict 
and its underlying causes”. 
 
To have any chance of succeeding a way ahead must alleviate the North’s concerns, however misguided 
they may appear, that the international community wants to dismantle the regime by force if necessary. 
What is also needed is a creative means of appealing to the self-reliance philosophy that is the regime’s 
driving force. With these objectives in mind the following proposals are submitted. 
 
The Six Party Talks should resume without preconditions. While that would require the setting aside of the 
nuclear issue for the time being, there appears to be no other viable option that would bring the North 
back to the table. Returning to the talks would provide a timely opportunity for the United States to 
reaffirm yet again that it has no intention to attack or invade North Korea, that it will provide a security 
guarantee to this effect and work to normalise ties {as it was prepared to do in the set of agreements 
reached during the fourth round of talks in 2005}. 
 
Either within the framework of the Six Party Talks, or jointly, the United States and China should convene 
a meeting that would examine ways of helping North Korea rebuild its economy through carefully 
targeted investment and economic assistance. The previous practice of providing food aid, although such 
aid is needed, carries the heavy baggage of dependency in the North Korean mind-set. The aim of such an 
approach would be to give the North Koreans confidence that they can build an economic model that 
would improve the lot of its citizenry and over time diminish the importance to the North of a nuclear 
weapons capability. It would also have another important benefit in reducing the cost of eventual 
reunification. 
 
Given the many complex security issues confronting the North-east Asian region at present, a case could 
also be made once the Six Party Talks have resumed, for re-shaping those Talks into a North-east Asian 
security dialogue. It is a concept much discussed but never developed. Encouraging North Korea to 
participate in such a dialogue would give it a stake in attempts to resolve strategic issues. That would 
require a sea change in approach on the part of Pyongyang, but it may be persuaded to see merit in 
participation rather than remaining a belligerent outsider resorting to threat and bluster. 
 
What might New Zealand contribute in pursuit of these proposals? The most obvious contribution New 
Zealand could make is to share its agricultural expertise. North Korean agriculture is in a parlous state. 
Our reputation in this field is second to none. We could directly contribute in this way to the North’s 
rebuilding of its economy. A much more modest proposal, but one that could open the door to other 
modest forms of assistance would be the development of a track two dialogue with North Korea.  
 
There can be no guarantees that the suggested approaches posited in this paper will succeed. Some of the 
six parties will find unappealing the idea of taking the nuclear issue off the table for the time being. They 
will see risks in such an approach. But there are mounting risks from staying with the status quo. Unless 
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we help North Korea to help itself the risk is that the situation on the peninsula will slide into conflict 
whether the result of calculation or miscalculation. That would have profound consequences for the whole 
Asia/Pacific community. There would be no immunity for New Zealand from such consequences. 
     
  
 
  
 
 
 
